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2.1 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN FUNCTION OF DETERMINING 
INCENTIVE SYSTEMS FOR MANAGERS 
 
 
Summary: Performance management, a very important process of human resource management 
(HRM), can be significant basis for creating the incentive systems for managers. Big enterprises 
usually reward their chief executive officer (CEO) for success in business. In the past period the 
amounts of managers’ rewards was not correlated with achieved performances of enterprises, so it was 
important to analyze amount of rewards given to the managers and methods that can be used to 
measure achieved managerial performances. Subject of this paper was the analysis of compensation 
systems for managers in ten most successful companies of the world and their relation with the 
business results presented trough specific indicators of performances. In addition, the paper was 
subjected to the analysis of several methods of measuring performances that can be used in 
determining realistic amounts and structures of CEO rewards and incentives. The aim of this study 
was the presentation of the relation between managers’ rewards and business performances and to find 
more objective methods for determining these rewards. Thus, compensation packages can meet the 
requirements of effectiveness and efficiency in terms of long-term goals and performances of business 
system. 
 
Keywords: human resource management, compensations, incentives, performance management, 
methods for performance measurement 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Performance management is a very important process of human resource management 
(HRM). It implies an assessment of current or previous results or performance of the 
employee, team or the whole organization. On such assessments companies creates its 
policies in many business areas related to HRM: the need for staff training, new recruitment, 
rewarding, etc. In the area of rewards, performance measurement can be significant basis for 
creating the incentive systems for managers. Namely, big enterprises usually reward their 
CEO for success in business. Companies were often very generous in the reward practice for 
managers. But, in the past period, the amounts of managers’ rewards was not correlated with 
achieved performances of enterprises, so it was important to analyze amount of rewards given 
to the managers and methods that can be used to measure achieved managerial performances.  
Subject of this paper was the analysis of compensation systems for managers in ten most 
successful companies of the world and their relation with the business results presented trough 
specific indicators of performances. Paper was subjected to the analysis of several methods of 
measuring performances that can be used in determining realistic amounts and structures of 
CEO rewards and incentives. The aim of this study was the presentation of the relation 
between managers’ rewards and business performances and more objective methods for 
determining these rewards so that compensation packages can meet the requirements of 
effectiveness and efficiency in terms of long-term goals and performances of business system. 
The paper is consisted from tree parts. In the first part authors defined performance 
measurement and performance measurement system. Second part was related to the analysis 
of the performances in the 10 most successful companies from USA (according to the list of 
the magazine Fortune 500) and to the analysis of the compensations of the CEOs in those 
companies. Third part was dedicated to the presentation of the more comprehensive 
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measurement systems of performances that will be better solution for the determining and 
creation of the CEO compensations. There are explained BSC and EVA concept. 
 
2. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
Performance measurement is an assessment of current or previous results of performance 
of the employee. Performance evaluation approach can be two fold - individual level and on 
exact data. First approach involves contact by type “face to face”; it is difficult for assessors 
because it activates emotions that can easily lead to conflict. Another approach focuses on the 
process of working that is based on exact data – results of the quantification and comparison 
with the standards (Štangl Šušnjar and Zimanji, 2005). PM in HRM can be made by different 
management methods such as management by objectives, multilaterally evaluation, bars, the 
method of critical events, ranking, essays, etc. Based on these established results, managers 
acquire the possibility of additional compensation by developing a system of benefits.  
At the beginning of the analysis we have presented some often cited definition of 
performance measurement (PM) and performance measurement systems (PMS). According to 
Neely, Gregory and Plats (1995) performance measurement is defined as ‘‘the process of 
quantifying effectiveness and efficiency of actions’’. One comprehensive definition of 
performance measurement is that PM is “the process of quantifying the efficiency and 
effectiveness of actions, in order to compare results against expectations, with the intent to 
motivate, guide and improve decision making” (Lardenoije, Van Raaij and Van Weele, 2005). 
Lebas (1995) characterizes performance management system as “the philosophy supported by 
performance measurement. It is the organization-wide shared vision, teamwork, training, 
incentives, etc. that surround the performance measurement activity”. PM system is “the set 
of metrics used to quantify the efficiency and effectiveness of actions, and the corresponding 
guidelines for linking these metrics to strategy and improvement” (Lardenoije, Van Raaij and 
Van Weele, 2005). The performance measures should be relevant, balanced, based on 
financial and non-financial indicators and related to internal and external stakeholders. 
Measures need to be related directly to the organization’s mission and objectives in order to 
reflect the company’s external competitive environment, customer requirements and internal 
objectives (Kennerley and Neely, 2002). 
It is important to notice some contemporary researches made in relation to the importance 
of PM in modern business. Nudurupati, Bititci, Kumar and Chan (2011) have reviewed and 
tackled the evolution of the performance measurement field in the context of information 
systems and change management. According to Bititci, Garengo, Dörfler and Nudurupati 
(2011) concluded that in general the performance measurement field seemed to have 
developed in response to global and business trends. Also, many other researches have been 
made to explain PM and its implementation in each area of business: profit, non-profit, public, 
private, etc. In this paper, PM was analyzed as the base for managerial compensations. 
 
3. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AS THE BASE FOR CREATING 
MANAGERIAL INCETIVE COMPENSATIONS 
 
When it comes to the compensation for managers, performance management gets even 
bigger role. The current bureaucratic models of determining these systems had the impact on 
their low motivational force as well as on problems between the owners and managers 
in terms of high agency costs. The most analyzed problem was the correlation of 
compensations with the performances of managers. So far, many studies revealed that there is 
no strong correlation between these variables. For example, in the research of author Ozkan 
(2011, p. 260), it have been pointed out to a weak effectiveness of corporate governance 
111 
reports in the UK, which suggested that compensation for managers should be more closely 
linked with their performance. In one other research it was found that annual change in 
managerial compensation in the US during the 70s and 80s of the twentieth century to a 
large extent were not correlated with changes in corporate performances – the 
total compensation of managers have varied only $3 to every $1,000 change in shareholder 
wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 2010, p. 64). Since managerial compensations are very complex 
category of HRM, there have to be made changes in modelling incentive compensations. 
Adequate systems of compensation for managers should be structured on the basis of actual 
performance. Also, it would be necessary to determine the controllable and non controllable 
factors (in the sense of those factors that are in the power of manager).  
If the long and short-term incentives for managers are in the question, a very interesting 
attitude was expressed by Malinić (2007) where he stated that:  
▪ Short-term compensation should be based on standard financial indicators, such 
as profit (with variations to make it after tax, profit before tax and profit before 
interest and taxes), rate of return, cash flow, earnings per share and the like; and long-
term compensation should be tied to several criteria that respect the long-term 
profitability; long-term position of the company and movement of the total 
shareholder returns (dividends and capital gains).  
▪ Criteria for achieving long-term compensation imposed are the market value of 
companies, economic value added - EVA, market value added - MVA, the 
total shareholder return - TSR and others.  
For the more comprehensive view of the performance measures and indicators in Table 1 
there are summarized the indicators for the evaluation of the performance of the organization. 
 
Table 1: Performance management tools and indicators 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
FINANCIAL INDICATORS INDICATORS OF TOTAL PERFORMANCES 
Return on Investment (ROI) Balanced scorecard (BSC)Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) Tableau du Board (TdB)Earnings per Share (EPS) 
Cash flow (CF) Performance Prism (PPR)Revenue (I) 
Profit (P) Performance Pyramid System (PPS)Total Shareholder return (TSR) 
Market Value Added (MVA) Productivity Measurement and Enhancement 
System (ProMES)Economic Value Added (EVA) 
Source: Malinić, 2007; Lardenoije, Van Raaij, Van Weele, 2005. 
In order to show the level of compensation, their structure and relation to the 
performance, it has been made the analysis of performances of the top ten USA companies 
(according to Fortune 500) and its managerial reward packages. Table 2 and 3 presented the 
performance indicators (table 2) and the level and structure of CEO compensations (table 3) 
for 2010. All data in table 2 are gained from Fortune list 500 (http://money.cnn.com). For 
table 3 it has been used the research of Hay Group for 2010 (http://www.haygroup.com).  
According to data in tables, it can be concluded next: 
▪ Each company from table 2, except Bank of America and Fannie Mae, had a profitable 
business 2010 year. There has been noticed the growth of revenues and profits, 
accompanied with the growth of earning per share (EPS) from 2009 to 2010. For example, 
the growth of the revenue is between 3.3 and 32.6 % (Fannie Mae reached even 429.2% 
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higher revenue than in 2009), the growth of profit is between 5.6 and 141.5%. EPS growth 
was from 20.8 to 135.2%.   
▪ Each company, except Bank of America and Fannie Mae, had positive indicators of ROA, 
ROE and ROI, which means that those companies have created return on assets, 
investments and equity. This can be explained as short-term gain for the company since all 
those indicators are related to the annual business and financial operations.  
▪ Companies reward their CEO with different elements of compensations, but it can be 
concluded that main are: base salary; annual incentives; long term incentives – stock 
options grants, restricted stock grants, performance-based grants in equity and cash; all 
other compensations (perquisites, personal benefits, tax gross-ups, discount stock 
purchases); change in nonqualified deferred compensation earnings plus change in 
pension value. 
▪ Basic salary is the smallest part of the total compensations, and it estimates from 6.97% 
(in Wall Mart) to 16.8% (in General Electric) of total compensations. In companies that 
did not create long and short-term incentives, salary is the biggest or even the only 
element of the compensations (Berkshire Hathaway and General Motors). Basic salary is 
determined by the working contract between managers and companies, and it is fixed 
amount that is paid with no relation to the performances.  
▪ Annual incentives are usually double or even several times bigger than salary. These 
incentives are paid in almost each company where have been created positive business 
result, profit and performance indicators of ROA, ROE, ROI and EPS. In Bank of 
America annual incentives were not paid since that corporation realized loss in 2010 of $-
2,238 millions. Annual incentives are usually paid for the short time period. 
▪ Long-term incentives have reached level from 58% to 74% of total compensations, with 
the exception of General Electric Company (LTI are only 22% of total compensations). 
Long-term incentives are differently used in each company. The most used are stock 
options, restricted stocks and performance based equity grants. The performance based 
cash grants were used only by one company. In addition, five companies form the Table 3 
used two LTI elements in rewarding its CEO - stock options and performance based 
equity grants. Last five companies decided to give to the CEOs only one LTI incentive - 
restricted stock grant.  
▪ Related to the long term incentives is also the tendency of rewarding CEO with more 
deferred compensations. Namely, performance based cash grants were used only in 
General Electric Company. All other companies gave to the CEOs compensations in form 
of capital – equity and stocks. For example, restricted stocks were given as compensation 
in four out of ten companies. Stock options were used in four cases.  
▪ Since the economic crisis had affected the business and economy in many world 
countries, wastefully CEO compensation models became untenable. HR managers are 
trying to create models that will be enough motivating but also sustainable in means of 
real business performances. The goal of any compensation system should be to attract, 
motivate and retain the best managers, while at the same time being fair to the 
shareholders.  
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Table 2: The performances of the 10 most successful companies from the list of Fortune in 2010 
R Company 
Key financial elements in millions of $ 
Pr 
(%) 
ROA 
(%) 
ROE 
(%) 
EPS ROI 
Revenues  
% 
change 
from 
2009 
Profits 
% 
change 
from 
2009 
Assets Stockholders' equity 
Market 
 value  
(3/25/2011) 
2000-
2010 
Annual 
growth 
(%) 
2010 
$ 
% 
change 
from 
2009 
2000-
2010 
Annual 
rate 
(%) 
2010 
(%) 
1 Wal-Mart Stores 421,849 3.3 16,389 14.3 180,663 68,542 182,764 3.9 9.1 23.9 12.3 4.47 20.8 1.4 3.2 
2 Exxon Mobil 354,674 24.6 30,460 58 302,510 146,839 414,638 8.6 10.1 20.7 9.5 6.22 56.3 7.7 10.1 
3 Chevron 196,337 20.1 19,024 81.5 184,769  105,081  214,355.5  9.7 10.3 18.1 9.1 9.48  80.9  11.6 22.9 
4 ConocoPhillips 184,966 32.6 11,358 133.8 156,314  68,562  116,812.3  6.1 7.3 16.6 7.7 7.62  135.2  12.2 38.8 
5 Fannie Mae 153,825 429.2 -14,014 N.A. 3,221,972  -2,599  447.9  -9.1 -0.4 N.A. N.A. -3.81  N.A.  -42.1 -74.6 
6 General Electric 151,628 -3.3 11,644 5.6 751.216  118.936  209,715.2  7.7 1.6 9.8 -1.8 1.06  5.0  -6.3 23.9 
7 Berkshire Hathaway 136,185 21.1 12,967 61 372,229  157,318  210,787.5  9.5 3.5 8.2 13.8  7.0 52.7  5.4 21.4 
8 General Motors 135,592 29.6 6,172 N.A. 138,898  36,180  49,116.6  4.6 4.4 17.1 N.A. 2.89  N.A.  N.A. N.A. 
9 Bank of America  134,194 -10.8 -2,238 -135.7 2,264,909  228,248  135,016.2  -1.7 -0.1 -1.0 N.A. -0.37  N.A.  -1.7 -11.2 
10 Ford Motor 128,954 9 6,561 141.5 164,687  -673  55,715  5.1 4.0 N.A -3.2 1.66 93.0  -1.2 67.9 
Source: http://money.cnn.com (systematized data according to the list of Fortune 500) 
 
Table 3: CEO compensations of the 10 most successful companies from the list of Fortune in 2010 
R Company 
Elements of total compensations for CEO in (000 $) 
Salary 
An. 
incenti
ves 
Long term incentives (000$) - LTI Total 
direct 
compensati
ons 
Change in 
Nonqualified Deferred 
Compensation + 
Change in Pension 
Value 
All Other 
Compensat
ion 
Total 
Compensation 
Total 
Realized 
LTI 
3-Year Realized 
Total Direct 
Compensation 
Stock 
option 
grants 
Restricted 
stock 
grants 
Performance 
Based Grant 
Equity 
Performance 
Based Grant 
Cash 
1 Wal-Mart Stores 1,232.7 3,852.1 0 3,347.5 9,304.9 0 17,737.1 499.1 476.6 18,712.7 17,592.8 N.A.6 
2 Exxon Mobil 2,207.0 3,360.0 0 15,465.4 0 0 21,032.4 7,476.3 443.9 28,952.6 7,989.7 33,000.2 
3 Chevron 1,479.2 3,000.0 5,535.2 0 3,752.4 0 13,776.8 2,273.3 220.5 16,260.5 3,101.7 N.A. 
4 ConocoPhillips 1,500.0 4,252.5 5,737.7 0 6,148.6 0 17,638.8 0 294.1 17,932.9 9,566.3 36,299.1 
5 Fannie Mae N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
6 General Electric 3,300.0 4,000.0 7,400.0 0 0 4,950.0 19,650.0 6,339.0 389.8 26,378.8 1,933.1 25,093.6 
7 Berkshire Hathaway 100.0 0 0 0 0 0 100.0 0 429.9 524.9 0 300.0 
8 General Motors 2.333.3 0 0 666.7 0 0 3,000.0 0 194.1 3,194.1 0 N.A. 
9 Bank of America  950.0 0 0 9,050.0 0 0 10,000.0 719.8 270.2 10,990.1 1,039.3 N.A. 
10 Ford Motor 1,400.0 9,450.0 7,500.0 0 7,492.5 0 25,842.5 0 678.0 26,520.5 9,298.0 25,888.0 
Source: http://www.haygroup.com (systematized data according to the list of CEO compensations survey 2010)
                                                 
6 Data not available 
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After the Tables 2 and 3 are discussed, it can be concluded that there are many issues 
related to the amount and structure of CEO compensation. These remunerations should be 
based on outcomes and total business performances of the company. Since only financial 
indicators are not suitable for the total compensation system, it should me mentioned some 
other performance measurement model in practice that could be linked to this problem. From 
all models presented in Table 1, BSC and EVA were found as the performance measurement 
models that can be used in function of efficient and effective CEO compensation systems.  
 
4. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS FOR CEO INCENTIVE 
COMPENSATIONS IN PRACTICE 
 
4.1. THE BALANCED SCORECARD (BSC)   
 
One of the best-known performance measurement system is the balanced scorecard (BSC), 
developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992; 1996; 1996a). Kaplan and Norton (1996a) define the 
BSC as “a multidimensional framework for describing, implementing and managing strategy 
at all levels of an enterprise by linking, through a logical structure, objectives, initiatives, and 
measures to an organization’s strategy”.  
Figure 1: Balanced Scorecard (BSC) 
 
 
Source: Kaplan and Norton, 1996, p. 76 
 
BSC complements the traditional financial performance measures with three non-financial 
key performance indicators (KPIs) which are presented in Figure 1:  
▪ financial perspective that is typically related to profitability;  
▪ customer perspective that includes several generic measures of successful outcomes 
from the company – customer satisfaction, market share;  
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▪ internal processes that focuses on the internal processes that will have the greatest 
impact on customer satisfaction and on achieving the organization’s financial 
perspectives;  
▪ learning and growth – the infrastructure of the organization has to build and manage to 
create long-term growth and improvement through people, systems and organizational 
procedures, is identified in this perspective (Lardenoije, Van Raaij and Van Weele, 
2005). 
Since Silk (1998) estimated that 60% of Fortune 1000 companies in the USA have had 
experienced BSC, there is a need of analyzing this performance measurement model in 
function of CEO compensations. Pollanen and Xi (2011) had investigated the use of BSC 
measures in executive compensation plans, particularly its performance consequences, and the 
fit between the use of BSC and firm characteristics. The findings underscored the importance 
of firm characteristics in the design and use of performance measurement and reward systems. 
Also, Creamer and Freund (2010) analyzed the BSC and one of the most important parts of its 
dataset was CEO compensations. They demonstrated how the boosting approach can be used 
to define a data driven board BSC with applications to 500 biggest USA companies.  
According to Purcell (2011, p. 7) “board is at the apex of a company‘s internal incentive 
structure and it is the board‘s decisions that shape the incentives culture for the whole 
organization and determine whether or not virtue – or its opposite – will be rewarded”. Boards 
must give enough weight to the intangible aspects of executive compensation, and not simply 
evaluate executive compensation in purely financial terms. Purcell emphasized that boards 
need to “incorporate the intangible drivers of responsible behaviour into a balanced scorecard 
gate opener for executive rewards to be triggered”.  
 
Table 4: Executive compensation systems according BSC dimensions 
Category Measure Weighting 
Financial (60%) 
EVA  
Unit Profit  
Market Growth  
25% 
20% 
15% 
Customer (20%) Customer satisfaction survey  Dealer satisfaction survey  
10% 
10% 
Internal Process (10%)  Above average rank on industry quality survey  Decrease in dealer delivery cycle time 
5% 
5% 
Innovation and Learning (10%) Suggestions/employee  Emp. satisfaction survey  
5% 
5% 
Source: Jones (2009) 
 
Without further literature analysis, in Table 4 it has been presented the example of CEO 
incentive compensation designed according to BSC. Jones (2009) claimed that CEO paid 
bonus percentage should be tied to the percentage of exceeding performance targets. From 
Table 4 it can be seen that main part of the CEO bonus should be related to its financial 
performances, measured by EVA, unit profit and market growth (60% of total earned bonus is 
consisted from financial indicators). The rest of 40% is related to customer’s indicators 
(20%), indicators of internal processes (10%) and indicators of learning and innovation 
(10%). 
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4.2. ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED (EVA)  
 
About the importance of EVA in function of increasing shareholder value there have been 
done many studies (Zakić, Vunjak, Bešić, Simić, 2012; Ilić, 2010; Ilić, 2009; Malinić, 2007; 
Balsley, 2005; Evans and Evans, 2002; Young and O’Byrne, 2001; Stern, Shiely, Ross, 2001; 
Wallace, 1997). EVA is defined as the change in the NOPAT (Net Operating Profit after 
Taxes) minus the change in the Cost of the Capital used to generate this NOPAT (Kumar and 
Kaura, 2002; Sharma and Kumar, 2010). EVA depends basically on the firm operating profit, 
taxes, debt level, and the cost of capital. EVA directs attention of the company or its managers 
on the value creation for shareholders. It suggests that managers focus on the question 
whether a company creates a yield above the cost of capital and thus help managers to analyze 
the reasons for the changes that are introduced. Therefore, in recent years the economic value 
added is often used as a basis for the establishment of a compensation system to motivate 
managers, so they behave in a manner that ensures the creation of shareholder value 
(Anđelković and Pešić, 2005, p. 54). 
EVA can provide investors with a normal return on the company’s shares—that is 
important not only for securities analysts in evaluating stocks, but also for corporate 
compensation committees in setting performance standards for management incentive 
compensation plans (O’Byrne, 1996). An examination of the compensation structure and 
economic value added of 209 companies in 1995 – 1998 provided evidence supporting 
incentive compensation where EVA is found to be positively and significantly related to 
incentive based compensation (Evans and Evans, 2002). Also, Dinu and Ciora (2012) in their 
research have presented the implementation of EVA as value based management technique 
for incentive compensation. Namely, EVA bonus plan measures excess EVA improvement as 
opposed to simply EVA growth over prior periods. It provides a more direct link to the true 
measure of shareholder wealth creation – returns above market expectations (Young and 
O’Byrne, 2001).  Following formula can be used to calculate CEO bonus in each year: 
 
 Current Year Bonus = Target Bonus + y% (EVA – Ei) (1) 
 
Target bonus is “the bonus earned by a manager for delivering the EVA improvement that 
is expected by investors. This expected EVA improvement should be equivalent to the EVA 
that will provide shareholders with a cost of capital return on the market value of their 
investment in the business” (Balsley, 2005). If EVA is below this level bonuses will be 
reduced while returns of shareholders do not fall to zero. At this level there will be no bonuses 
for managers. EVA – EI represents “the change in EVA less expected EVA improvement. 
This is meant to capture the incremental EVA that a manager has delivered above and beyond 
the EVA growth that investors expect and have already paid for. The percentage of the 
incremental performance that is returned to management (y) is established by the 
compensation committee” (Balsley, 2005). 
Additional incentives beyond the level of the target bonus are provided for increasing the 
EVA above the level provided by covering the total cost of capital and only the part of EVA 
that is increased above the expected level. In this way it will be prevented the excessive 
increase of compensation costs. If the criteria for bonuses was any increase in EVA, then 
there will be situations in which one reached EVA (above the level that provides target 
bonus) is decreasing, which is usually accompanied by a decline in value of shares and 
managers will still exercise bonuses over  target level (Malinić, 2007). Because of this, Stern 
Stewart & Co proposed the use of a “bonus bank” designed to base a manager’s annual bonus 
payout on multi-period EVA delivery (presented in Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: EVA bonus bank 
 
Source: Desai, Ferri, Treadwell, 2006, p. 20 
 
According to bonus bank concept: 
▪ In every year, the “current year bonus” is calculated using the formula described above 
and based on the manager’s performance during that year.  
▪ That “current year bonus” is then placed in a “bonus bank” that also holds the deferred 
(or unpaid portion of) bonuses from prior years.  
▪ The bonus bank balance (after the current year bonus has been included), rather than 
the current year bonus, then determines the amount of bonus actually earned by a 
manager each year. The amount earned is determined in two steps:  
- first, 100% of the bonus bank (if possible) is paid up to the amount of the target 
bonus;  
- second, plus 1/3 of the remaining bonus bank (after the target bonus) (Balsley, 
2005). 
 
Table 5: Hypothetical example of the EVA bonus 
Business Unit 1 Business Unit 2 Business Unit 3 
Beginning of period EVA ($) 20,000,000 40,000,000 10,000,000
End of period EVA ($) 30,000,000 50,000,000 12,000,000
Incremental EVA Delivered ( $) 10,000,000 10,000,000 2,000,000
Expected EVA Improvement ($) 5,000,000 10,000,000 5,000,000
Target Bonus ($) 100,000 100,000 0
Incremental Bonus ($) 2% * (10 - 5) 2% * (10 - 10) 2% * (2 - 5)
Bonus for EVA Improvement  
beyond Shareholders Expectations  100,000 0 -60,000
Total CEO Bonus 200,000 100,000 -60,000
Source: Balsley, 2005 (adjusted) 
Table 5 presented an example of calculating bonus compensation for the manager in 
accordance with the methodology of EVA. In the first case, business unit 1, if manager 
succeeds to create improvement of EVA (in table 5 this was $10,000,000) above the 
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expectation of shareholders (which was $5,000,000) he will get two parts of total bonus. First, 
manager will get $100,000 of target bonus since he succeeded to increase EVA to the 
shareholder’s expectation. Second, manager will be granted with another $100,000 since he 
improved EVA above expectations (over $5,000,000 in this example). According to author 
Balsley (2005), if the manager realizes an increase above the expectations of shareholders, he 
wins percentage of incremental increase which is usually about 2-3% of incremental increase. 
In this example, the incremental increase is $ 5,000,000 ($ 10 million total increase minus the 
expected increase of $5,000,000 from shareholders) and 2% of $5,000,000 estimates 
$100,000. Adding these two amounts, manager gets the bonus of $200,000. If manager 
succeeds to increase EVA only to the level of shareholder’s expectations (business unit 2 
from table 5) he will get only target bonus ($100,000). If EVA is below shareholder’s 
expectations, bonus will not be paid at all (example of business unit 3). 
 
Table 6: Hypothetical example of the EVA bonus bank concept 
Business Unit 1 First year Second year Third year 
Beginning of period EVA ($) 20,000,000 40,000,000 10,000,000
End of period EVA ($) -30,000,000 46,000,000 13,000,000
Incremental EVA Delivered ( $) 10,000,000 6,000,000 3,000,000
Expected EVA Improvement ($) 5,000,000 5,000,000 5,000,000
Achieved Expected EVA 
Improvement? yes yes no
Target Bonus ($) 100,000 100,000 0
Incremental Bonus - IB ($) 2% * (10 - 5) 2% * (6 - 5) 2% * (3 - 5)
Bonus for EVA Improvement  
beyond Shareholders Expectations 100,000 20,000 -40,000
Total CEO Bonus 200,000 120,000 0
Total CEO Year Bonus 200,000 186,667 0
CEO Bonus Paid 100,000 + 1/3 IB 100,000 + 1/3 IB 100,000 + 1/3 IB
133,333 128,889 0 
Ending Bonus Bank 66,667 57,778 17,778 
Source: Author's calculation according to the example of author Balsley, 2005. 
 
Since the economic crisis underscored the problems of irrational compensation for 
managers, the concept of EVA can be used in function of reducing wasteful bonuses. 
Although EVA bonus is more sophisticated method for creating managers bonus, it is also 
important to describe EVA bonus bank with one hypothetical example. Specifically, in table 6 
it has been shown that the use of formula for bank bonuses by EVA enables deferred payment 
of bonuses to managers (e.g. for three years). Bonus that is earned in one fiscal year is the 
sum of the target bonus that the manager receives if it makes EVE increase over shareholders 
expectations and percentage of incremental bonus (described in table 5). Table 6 presented 
manager’s bonus payment after making $200,000 in total, using the formula for the bonus 
bank. Namely, target bonus is paid in total (in this example target bonus is $100,000) while 
the remaining part of the bonus (incremental bonus) is paid up to 1/3 of total amount (1/3 of 
$100,000). In this way, manager gets $133,333 ($100,000 of target bonus plus $33,333 of 
incremental bonus) instead of $200,000, and the remaining incremental bonus of $66,667 is 
located in the bank bonus for the next period. If business manager in the coming period 
doesn’t achieve EVA increase equally with or above the expectations of shareholders, the 
bonus will not be paid. The value of the bank bonus will be transferred in the next period, 
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which can be a source of motivation for the manager to increase bonus bank amount, and thus 
the payment of bonuses for the next year. In table 6 it can be seen that bonus bank in first year 
is $66,667. For the second year, manager succeeded the increase of EVA again above the 
shareholder’s expectations, but in smaller amount ($1,000,000 above expectations). The total 
bonus is calculated in the same way, $100,000 target bonus plus percentage of incremental 
bonus (in this case it is 2% of $1,000,000 which estimates $20,000). Total bonus for second 
year is $120,000, but since bonus bank contained the rest of incremental bonus form first 
year, $66,667, total bonus bank is $186,667 ($100,000 of target bonus and $86,667 of banked 
incremental bonus). According to the methodology of EVA bonus bank, payment will be 
$128,889 ($100,000 plus 1/3 of $86,667). The rest of $57,778 is placed in bonus bank for the 
next year. In third year, manager has not increased EVA up to expectations of shareholders, 
so bonus was not paid, and the amount of bonus bank was reduced for the percentage of 
incremental loss (2% of -$2,000,000). After reducing bonus bank for $40,000 the rest for the 
next (fourth) year is $17,778. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Incentive systems for managers are very complex area of HRM. A mixture of 
compensations elements, importance of short and long – term incentives for managers and 
problem of rewarding in the past make this issue more sophisticated. Usually, executive 
compensations was weakly correlated or even no correlated with the achieved performances. 
Because of these issues and problems, there is a need for improvement in the design of 
managerial compensations. Conclusions of this paper are: 
▪ Main elements of CEO compensations are: base salary, annual incentives, long term 
incentives, all other compensations, change in nonqualified deferred compensation 
earnings plus change in pension value.  
▪ Basic salary is the smallest part of the total compensations in companies that rewarded its 
managers with diversified compensation package, and it estimates from 6.97% to 16.8%.  
▪ Annual incentives are usually double or even several times bigger than salary. These 
incentives are paid in almost each company where have been created positive business 
result and performance indicators of ROA, ROE, ROI and EPS.  
▪ Long-term incentives have reached level from 58% to 74% of total compensations. The 
most used are stock options, restricted stocks and performance based equity grants. 
Related to the long term incentives is also the tendency of rewarding CEO with more 
deferred compensations.  
▪ Since there are a need of implementing holistic performance measures for defining basis 
for manager’s incentives, authors decided to analyze two measures: BSC and EVA 
concept.  
▪ One of the best known performance measurement systems is the balanced scorecard that 
provides an enterprise view of an organization’s overall performance. According to BSC, 
CEO paid bonus percentage should be tied to the percentage of exceeding performance 
targets, so main part of the CEO bonus will be related to its financial performances, 
measured by EVA, unit profit and market growth (60% of total earned bonus). The rest of 
40% will be related to customer’s indicators (20%), indicators of internal processes (10%) 
and indicators of learning and innovation (10%). 
▪ EVA incentive compensations are based not only on the year increase in EVA, but on the 
increase that is above expected EVA improvement. Bonus bank is usually used to 
motivate managers to make decisions that will create superior performances and value for 
the shareholders continuously. This method will connect results of managers to the 
deferred bonus payout (payout will be set in defined time period, for example three years).  
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